**** PROGRAM FILE FOR "INFORMAL VERSUS FORMAL BARGAINING STRUCTURES" PROJECT: REPORTED MODELS' RESULTS ****
 
 
* OPEN STATA OUTPUT FILE LOG *

   log using "C:\Users\gk57526\Dropbox\Informal & Formal Bargaining (BAA Reforms)\JOP Replication File Materials\Output\execbudinfluence.08-26-2020.REPORTED MODELS.comments.smcl" 




 * OPEN "EXECUTIVE BUDGETARY INFLUENCE" DATABASE WITH NEWLY CREATED VARIABLES
 
use "C:\Users\gk57526\Dropbox\Informal & Formal Bargaining (BAA Reforms)\JOP Replication File Materials\Data\execbudinfluence.08-26-2020.REPORTED MODELS.dta", replace

 

*** DECLARE DATABASE AS A PANEL (AGENCY ID * FISCAL YEAR): 

xtset agenid fyear, yearly

*
*
*

*** GENERATE ANNUAL BUDGETARY PERCENTAGE VARIABLES BASED ON AVERAGE BASE FROM CURRENT AND PRECEDING YEAR IN THE DENOMINATOR TO MINIMIZE SKEW, KURTOSIS, AND EXTREME VARIATION ****
*** range bounded between -200% & + 200% annual percentage change ***
*
*
generate congbudchangereg2 = ((realcongappreg - l1.realcongappreg)/ ((0.5*realcongappreg) + (0.5*l1.realcongappreg)))*100
*
generate congbudchangetot2 = ((realcongapptot - l1.realcongapptot)/ ((0.5*realcongapptot) + (0.5*l1.realcongapptot)))*100
*
*
*
generate execbudchangereg2 = ((realexecestreg - l1.realexecestreg)/ ((0.5*realexecestreg) + (0.5*l1.realexecestreg)))*100
*
generate execbudchangetot2 = ((realexecesttot - l1.realexecesttot)/ ((0.5*realexecesttot) + (0.5*l1.realexecesttot)))*100

*
*


*** LAG CONGRESSIONAL APPROPRIATION BUDGET CHANGE DEPENDENT VARIABLE ***
*
*
generate l1congbudchangereg2 = l1.congbudchangereg2
*
generate l1congbudchangetot2 = l1.congbudchangetot2

*
*
*** GENERATE EXECUTIVE BUDGETARY REQUEST/ESTIMATE INTERACTIONS ***

generate ebcreg2baa = execbudchangereg2*bureauofbudget
*
generate ebctot2baa = execbudchangetot2*bureauofbudget

*
*
*

************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************



******* PROPOSITION 1: DID BAA REFORMS/CENTRALIZATION IMPROVE THE CREDIBILITY OF THE EXECUTIVE VETO THREAT [AVET LOGIC OF KIEWIET AND MCCUBBINS 1988, 1991]? ************

** POSIT THAT E <= A: REGIMEREG, REGIMETOT = 1 (I.E., FAVORABLE EXECUTIVE BARGAINING POSITION) IS MORE PREVALENT IN POST-BAA ERA COMPARED TO PRE-BAA ERA **
** POSIT THAT E > A : REGIMEREG, REGIMETOT = 0 (I.E., UNFAVORABLE EXECUTIVE BARGAINING POSITION) IS LESS PREVALENT IN POST-BAA ERA COMPARED TO PRE-BAA ERA **




*** FIRST, OBTAIN CORRECT MATCHED EFFECTIVE SAMPLE BASED ON ERS REGRESSION MODELS EMPLOYED IN THIS STUDY [n = 665] ***

quietly movestay congbudchangereg2  l1congbudchangereg2  execbudchangereg2 ebcreg2baa  bureauofbudget lnagencyage unifiedpartygovt  presadminyear ///
if agenid!=15, cluster(agenid)  select(regimereg = executiveagency)



*** FIGURE 1 COMPUTED STATISTICS [MANUSCRIPT]: DIFFERENCE IN PROPORTIONS TEST INVOLVING PROPORTION OF CREDIBLE VETO THREAT EXECUTIVE BUDGET PROPOSALS [E <= A] IN PRE-BAA VERSUS POST-BAA ERAS [TOTAL & REGULARY DISCRETIONARY BUDGETS] ***


tab regimereg regimetot if e(sample)
*
*
tab regimereg bureauofbudget if e(sample)

prtest regimereg if e(sample), by(bureauofbudget)
*
*
*
tab regimetot bureauofbudget if e(sample)

prtest regimetot if e(sample), by(bureauofbudget)
*
*
*

*** PLEASE NOTE THAT ONLY A TOTAL OF 17 CASES ARE CODED DIFFERENTLY BETWEEN THE PAIR OF BUDGETARY BARGAINING REGIME VARIABLES [REGIMEREG & REGIMETOT] ***  


*******************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************
*****************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************



******* PROPOSITION 2: DOES A STRONGER EXECUTIVE VETO THREAT [VIA BAA REFORMS] TRANSLATE INTO GREATER EXECUTIVE BUDGETARY INFLUENCE UNDER A WEAK VETO THREAT? ************


** POSIT THAT EXECUTIVE BUDGETARY INFLUENCE HAS DECLINED [IMPROVED] IN POST-BAA ERA COMPARED TO PRE-BAA ERA FOR CREDIBLE (NON-CREDIBLE) VETO THREAT BUDGET PROPOSALS [E <= A] ([E > A]) **





*** TABLE 1 [MANUSCRIPT]: BASELINE MODEL SPECIFICATION, I -- REGULAR DISCRETIONARY BUDGET [EXCLUDES EXTRAMURAL FUNDS]: ///
***                       ENDOGENOUS REGIME SWITCHING REGRESSION MODELS ESTIMATED BY FIML ///
***                       [SELECTIVITY INSTRUMENT: AGENCY DESIGN (EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT / INDEPENDENT AGENCY BINARY DISTINCTION) ***

movestay congbudchangereg2  l1congbudchangereg2 execbudchangereg2 ebcreg2baa bureauofbudget ///
lnagencyage unifiedpartygovt presadminyear if agenid!=15, cluster(agenid) select(regimereg = executiveagency) difficult
*
estat ic
*
*
*
*
** TABLE SI-5B [REGULAR BUDGET: REPORTED MODEL] COMPUTED STATISTICS [SECTION 5. SUPPORTING INFORMATION DOCUMENT: REGULAR DISCRETIONARY BUDGET MODEL] WITHIN-REGIME MODEL RESTRICTION/COEFFICIENTS **

* MARGINAL EFFECT OF EBI UNDER PRE-BAA REFORMS (REGIME 1: E <= A)
lincom [congbudchangereg2_1]execbudchangereg2
*
*
* MARGINAL EFFECT OF EBI UNDER POST-BAA REFORMS (REGIME 1: E <= A)
lincom [congbudchangereg2_1]execbudchangereg2 + [congbudchangereg2_1]ebcreg2baa
*
*
* MARGINAL EFFECT OF EBI UNDER PRE-BAA REFORMS (REGIME 0: E > A)
lincom [congbudchangereg2_0]execbudchangereg2
*
*
* MARGINAL EFFECT OF EBI UNDER POST-BAA REFORMS (REGIME 0: E > A)
lincom [congbudchangereg2_0]execbudchangereg2 + [congbudchangereg2_0]ebcreg2baa
*
*
*
* PARTIAL DIFFERENTIAL MARGINAL EFFECT OF EBI UNDER POST-BAA REFORMS (REGIME 1 VS. REGIME 0)
lincom [congbudchangereg2_1]ebcreg2baa - [congbudchangereg2_0]ebcreg2baa 
*
*
*
*
** FIGURE 2 & TABLE SI-4B COMPUTED STATISTICS [MANUSCRIPT & SECTION 4.SUPPORTING INFORMATION DOCUMENT: REGULAR DISCRETIONARY BUDGET MODEL] **

* BETA_12: DIFFERENTIAL MARGINAL EFFECT OF EBI UNDER PRE-BAA - POST-BAA REFORMS (REGIME 1: E <= A)
lincom [congbudchangereg2_1]ebcreg2baa  
*
*
* BETA_22: DIFFERENTIAL MARGINAL EFFECT OF EBI UNDER PRE-BAA - POST-BAA REFORMS  (REGIME 0: E > A)
lincom [congbudchangereg2_0]ebcreg2baa  
*
*
*
* BETA_22 - BETA_12: PARTIAL DIFFERENTIAL MARGINAL EFFECT OF EBI UNDER POST-BAA REFORMS (REGIME 1 VS. REGIME 0)
lincom [congbudchangereg2_1]ebcreg2baa - [congbudchangereg2_0]ebcreg2baa 



***********************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************



*** TABLE 1 [MANUSCRIPT]: BASELINE MODEL SPECIFICATION, II -- TOTAL DISCRETIONARY BUDGET [INCLUDES EXTRAMURAL FUNDS]: ///
***                       ENDOGENOUS REGIME SWITCHING REGRESSION MODELS ESTIMATED BY FIML ///
***                       [SELECTIVITY INSTRUMENT: AGENCY DESIGN (EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT / INDEPENDENT AGENCY BINARY DISTINCTION) ***

movestay congbudchangetot2 l1congbudchangetot2  execbudchangetot2 ebctot2baa bureauofbudget ///
lnagencyage unifiedpartygovt presadminyear ///
if agenid!=15, cluster(agenid) /// 
select(regimetot = executiveagency) difficult
*
estat ic
*
*
*

** TABLE SI-5B [TOTAL BUDGET: REPORTED MODEL] COMPUTED STATISTICS [SECTION 5. SUPPORTING INFORMATION DOCUMENT: TOTAL DISCRETIONARY BUDGET MODEL] WITHIN-REGIME MODEL RESTRICTION/COEFFICIENTS **

* MARGINAL EFFECT OF EBI UNDER PRE-BAA REFORMS (REGIME 1: E <= A)
lincom [congbudchangetot2_1]execbudchangetot2
*
*
* MARGINAL EFFECT OF EBI UNDER POST-BAA REFORMS (REGIME 1: E <= A)
lincom [congbudchangetot2_1]execbudchangetot2 + [congbudchangetot2_1]ebctot2baa
*
*
* MARGINAL EFFECT OF EBI UNDER PRE-BAA REFORMS (REGIME 0: E > A)
lincom [congbudchangetot2_0]execbudchangetot2
*
*
* MARGINAL EFFECT OF EBI UNDER POST-BAA REFORMS (REGIME 0: E > A)
lincom [congbudchangetot2_0]execbudchangetot2 + [congbudchangetot2_0]ebctot2baa
*
*
*
* PARTIAL DIFFERENTIAL MARGINAL EFFECT OF EBI UNDER POST-BAA REFORMS (REGIME 1 VS. REGIME 0)
lincom [congbudchangetot2_1]ebctot2baa - [congbudchangetot2_0]ebctot2baa 
*
*
*
*
*

** FIGURE 2 & TABLE SI-4B COMPUTED STATISTICS [MANUSCRIPT & SECTION 4.SUPPORTING INFORMATION DOCUMENT: TOTAL DISCRETIONARY BUDGET MODEL] **


*  BETA_12: DIFFERENTIAL MARGINAL EFFECT OF EBI UNDER PRE-BAA - POST-BAA REFORMS (REGIME 1: E <= A)
lincom [congbudchangetot2_1]ebctot2baa  
*
*
*  BETA_22: DIFFERENTIAL MARGINAL EFFECT OF EBI UNDER PRE-BAA - POST-BAA REFORMS  (REGIME 0: E > A)
lincom [congbudchangetot2_0]ebctot2baa  
*
*
*
* BETA_22 - BETA_12: DIFFERENTIAL MARGINAL EFFECT OF EBI UNDER POST-BAA REFORMS (REGIME 1 VS. REGIME 0)
lincom [congbudchangetot2_1]ebctot2baa - [congbudchangetot2_0]ebctot2baa 


************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************
*****************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************

 

 
 
 ******* PROPOSITION 3: DOES CENTRALIZATION [VIA BAA REFORMS] REDUCE THE BUDGETARY INFLUENCE OF AGENCY HEADS? **********
 


 
*** DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS ON AGENCY HEAD TENURE ****

quietly movestay congbudchangetot2 l1congbudchangetot2  execbudchangetot2 ebctot2baa lnagencyheadtenure  bureauofbudget ///
lnagencyage unifiedpartygovt  presadminyear if agenid!=15, cluster(agenid) ///
select(regimetot = executiveagency) difficult
*
*
tab agencyheadtenure if e(sample)
sum agencyheadtenure if e(sample), detail
*
*
*
*
****************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************
 
 

*** GENERATE NATURAL LOGARITHM OF AGENCY HEAD TENURE COVARIATE INTERACTIONS FOR SUBSEQUENT REGRESSION MODELS TESTING PROPOSITION 3 ***

generate baalnaht = bureauofbudget * lnagencyheadtenure
*
generate ebcreg2lnaht = execbudchangereg2 * lnagencyheadtenure
generate ebctot2lnaht = execbudchangetot2 * lnagencyheadtenure
*
generate ebcreg2baalnaht = execbudchangereg2 * bureauofbudget * lnagencyheadtenure
generate ebctot2baalnaht = execbudchangetot2 * bureauofbudget * lnagencyheadtenure
*
*
*
tab lnagencyheadtenure if e(sample)
sum lnagencyheadtenure if e(sample), detail
*
*
*
*
*
*
*

correlate agencyheadtenure lnagencyheadtenure if e(sample)



***********************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************




*** TABLE 2 [MANUSCRIPT]: AUGMENTED AGENCY HEAD MODEL SPECIFICATION, I -- REGULAR DISCRETIONARY BUDGET [EXCLUDES EXTRAMURAL FUNDS]: ENDOGENOUS REGIME SWITCHING REGRESSION MODELS /// ***                       ESTIMATED BY FIML [SELECTIVITY INSTRUMENT: AGENCY DESIGN (EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT / INDEPENDENT AGENCY BINARY DISTINCTION) ///
***                       *** LN [AGENCY HEAD TENURE [AHT]] -- FULL SAMPLE OF AHT OBSERVATIONS ***
***                       

movestay (congbudchangereg2 l1congbudchangereg2  execbudchangereg2 bureauofbudget ebcreg2baa lnagencyheadtenure  /// 
baalnaht  ebcreg2lnaht  ebcreg2baalnaht  ///
lnagencyage unifiedpartygovt presadminyear) if agenid!=15, cluster(agenid) ///
select(regimereg = executiveagency) difficult
*
estat ic
*
*
*


***********************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************




********** EVALUATING PROPOSITION 3 [WITHIN-REGIME MODEL RESTRICTION/COEFFICIENTS] **************************



*** TABLE SI-4B [REGULAR BUDGET: REPORTED MODEL] COMPUTED STATISTICS [SECTION 4. SUPPORTING INFORMATION DOCUMENT: REGULAR DISCRETIONARY BUDGET MODEL] WITHIN-REGIME MODEL RESTRICTION/COEFFICIENTS **

** BETA_13: REGIME 1: E <= A)  **
lincom [congbudchangereg2_1]ebcreg2lnaht 
*
*
** BETA_23: REGIME 0: E > A  **
lincom [congbudchangereg2_0]ebcreg2lnaht 
*
*
** BETA_14: REGIME 1: E <= A **
lincom  [congbudchangereg2_1]ebcreg2baalnaht
*
*
** BETA_24: REGIME 0: E > A  **
lincom  [congbudchangereg2_0]ebcreg2baalnaht 
*
*
*
*

** FIGURE 3 COMPUTED STATISTICS [MANUSCRIPT: REGULAR DISCRETIONARY BUDGET MODEL] **


*** FIGURE 3A COMPUTED STATISTICS [MANUSCRIPT]: PRE-BAA REFORMS -- (REGIME 1: E <= A)   ***

* [SEE ALSO, TABLE SI-5C: REGULAR BUDGET - REPORTED MODEL] CONDITIONAL MARGINAL EFFECT OF EBI UNDER PRE-BAA REFORMS WHEN LN[AHT] = 0 == AHT = 1 YEAR OF EXPERIENCE  *
lincom [congbudchangereg2_1]execbudchangereg2
*
*
* CONDITIONAL MARGINAL EFFECT OF EBI UNDER PRE-BAA REFORMS WHEN LN[AHT] = 0.6931472 == AHT = 2 YEARS OF EXPERIENCE  *
lincom [congbudchangereg2_1]execbudchangereg2 + [congbudchangereg2_1]ebcreg2lnaht*0.6931472
*
*
* CONDITIONAL MARGINAL EFFECT OF EBI UNDER PRE-BAA REFORMS WHEN LN[AHT] = 1.386294 == AHT = 4 YEARS OF EXPERIENCE  *
lincom [congbudchangereg2_1]execbudchangereg2 + [congbudchangereg2_1]ebcreg2lnaht*1.386294
*
*
* [SEE ALSO, TABLE SI-5C: REGULAR BUDGET - REPORTED MODEL] CONDITIONAL MARGINAL EFFECT OF EBI UNDER PRE-BAA REFORMS WHEN LN[AHT] = 1.791759  == AHT = 6 YEARS OF EXPERIENCE  *
lincom [congbudchangereg2_1]execbudchangereg2 + [congbudchangereg2_1]ebcreg2lnaht*1.791759 
*
*
* CONDITIONAL MARGINAL EFFECT OF EBI UNDER PRE-BAA REFORMS WHEN LN[AHT] = 2.079442  == AHT = 8 YEARS OF EXPERIENCE  *
lincom [congbudchangereg2_1]execbudchangereg2 + [congbudchangereg2_1]ebcreg2lnaht*2.079442 
*
*
* CONDITIONAL MARGINAL EFFECT OF EBI UNDER PRE-BAA REFORMS WHEN LN[AHT] = 2.302585  == AHT = 10 YEARS OF EXPERIENCE  *
lincom [congbudchangereg2_1]execbudchangereg2 + [congbudchangereg2_1]ebcreg2lnaht*2.302585
*
*
* [SEE ALSO, TABLE SI-5C: REGULAR BUDGET - REPORTED MODEL] CONDITIONAL MARGINAL EFFECT OF EBI UNDER PRE-BAA REFORMS WHEN LN[AHT] = 2.484907  == AHT = 12 YEARS OF EXPERIENCE  *
lincom [congbudchangereg2_1]execbudchangereg2 + [congbudchangereg2_1]ebcreg2lnaht*2.484907
*
*
*
*
*
*** FIGURE 3E COMPUTED STATISTICS [MANUSCRIPT]: POST-BAA REFORMS -- (REGIME 1: E <= A)   ***

* [SEE ALSO, TABLE SI-5C: REGULAR BUDGET - REPORTED MODEL] CONDITIONAL MARGINAL EFFECT OF EBI UNDER POST-BAA REFORMS WHEN LN[AHT] = 0 == AHT = 1 YEAR OF EXPERIENCE  *
lincom [congbudchangereg2_1]execbudchangereg2 + [congbudchangereg2_1]ebcreg2baa 
*
*
* CONDITIONAL MARGINAL EFFECT OF EBI UNDER POST-BAA REFORMS WHEN LN[AHT] = 0.6931472 == AHT = 2 YEARS OF EXPERIENCE *
lincom [congbudchangereg2_1]execbudchangereg2 + [congbudchangereg2_1]ebcreg2baa + [congbudchangereg2_1]ebcreg2lnaht*0.6931472 + [congbudchangereg2_1]ebcreg2baalnaht*0.6931472
*
*
* CONDITIONAL MARGINAL EFFECT OF EBI UNDER POST-BAA REFORMS  WHEN LN[AHT] = 1.386294 == AHT = 4 YEARS OF EXPERIENCE *
lincom [congbudchangereg2_1]execbudchangereg2 + [congbudchangereg2_1]ebcreg2baa + [congbudchangereg2_1]ebcreg2lnaht*1.386294 + [congbudchangereg2_1]ebcreg2baalnaht*1.386294
*
*
* [SEE ALSO, TABLE SI-5C: REGULAR BUDGET - REPORTED MODEL] CONDITIONAL MARGINAL EFFECT OF EBI UNDER POST-BAA REFORMS WHEN LN[AHT] = 1.791759 == AHT = 6 YEARS OF EXPERIENCE *
lincom [congbudchangereg2_1]execbudchangereg2 + [congbudchangereg2_1]ebcreg2baa + [congbudchangereg2_1]ebcreg2lnaht*1.791759 + [congbudchangereg2_1]ebcreg2baalnaht*1.791759
*
*
* CONDITIONAL MARGINAL EFFECT OF EBI UNDER POST-BAA REFORMS  WHEN LN[AHT] = 2.079442 == AHT = 8 YEARS OF EXPERIENCE *
lincom [congbudchangereg2_1]execbudchangereg2 + [congbudchangereg2_1]ebcreg2baa + [congbudchangereg2_1]ebcreg2lnaht*2.079442 + [congbudchangereg2_1]ebcreg2baalnaht*2.079442
*
*
* CONDITIONAL MARGINAL EFFECT OF EBI UNDER POST-BAA REFORMS WHEN LN[AHT] = 2.302585  == AHT = 10 YEARS OF EXPERIENCE  *
lincom [congbudchangereg2_1]execbudchangereg2 + [congbudchangereg2_1]ebcreg2baa + [congbudchangereg2_1]ebcreg2lnaht*2.302585 + [congbudchangereg2_1]ebcreg2baalnaht*2.302585
*
*
* [SEE ALSO, TABLE SI-5C: REGULAR BUDGET - REPORTED MODEL] CONDITIONAL MARGINAL EFFECT OF EBI UNDER POST-BAA REFORMS WHEN LN[AHT] = 2.484907  == AHT = 12 YEARS OF EXPERIENCE  *
lincom [congbudchangereg2_1]execbudchangereg2 + [congbudchangereg2_1]ebcreg2baa + [congbudchangereg2_1]ebcreg2lnaht*2.484907 + [congbudchangereg2_1]ebcreg2baalnaht*2.484907
*
*
*
*
*** FIGURE 3C COMPUTED STATISTICS [MANUSCRIPT]: PRE-BAA REFORMS -- (REGIME 0: E > A)   ***

* [SEE ALSO, TABLE SI-5C: REGULAR BUDGET - REPORTED MODEL] CONDITIONAL MARGINAL EFFECT OF EBI UNDER PRE-BAA REFORMS WHEN LN[AHT] = 0 == AHT = 1 YEAR OF EXPERIENCE  *
lincom [congbudchangereg2_0]execbudchangereg2
*
*
* CONDITIONAL MARGINAL EFFECT OF EBI UNDER PRE-BAA REFORMS WHEN LN[AHT] = 0.6931472 == AHT = 2 YEARS OF EXPERIENCE  *
lincom [congbudchangereg2_0]execbudchangereg2 + [congbudchangereg2_0]ebcreg2lnaht*0.6931472  
*
*
* CONDITIONAL MARGINAL EFFECT OF EBI UNDER PRE-BAA REFORMS WHEN LN[AHT] = 1.386294 == AHT = 4 YEARS OF EXPERIENCE  *
lincom [congbudchangereg2_0]execbudchangereg2 + [congbudchangereg2_0]ebcreg2lnaht*1.386294 
*
*
* [SEE ALSO, TABLE SI-5C: REGULAR BUDGET - REPORTED MODEL] CONDITIONAL MARGINAL EFFECT OF EBI UNDER PRE-BAA REFORMS WHEN LN[AHT] = 1.791759  == AHT = 6 YEARS OF EXPERIENCE  *
lincom [congbudchangereg2_0]execbudchangereg2 + [congbudchangereg2_0]ebcreg2lnaht*1.791759 
*
*
* CONDITIONAL MARGINAL EFFECT OF EBI UNDER PRE-BAA REFORMS WHEN LN[AHT] = 2.079442  == AHT = 8 YEARS OF EXPERIENCE  *
lincom [congbudchangereg2_0]execbudchangereg2 + [congbudchangereg2_0]ebcreg2lnaht*2.079442 
*
*
* CONDITIONAL MARGINAL EFFECT OF EBI UNDER PRE-BAA REFORMS WHEN LN[AHT] = 2.302585  == AHT = 10 YEARS OF EXPERIENCE  *
lincom [congbudchangereg2_0]execbudchangereg2 + [congbudchangereg2_0]ebcreg2lnaht*2.302585 
*
*
* [SEE ALSO, TABLE SI-5C: REGULAR BUDGET - REPORTED MODEL] CONDITIONAL MARGINAL EFFECT OF EBI UNDER PRE-BAA REFORMS WHEN LN[AHT] = 2.484907  == AHT = 12 YEARS OF EXPERIENCE  *
lincom [congbudchangereg2_0]execbudchangereg2 + [congbudchangereg2_0]ebcreg2lnaht*2.484907  
*
*
*
*
*** FIGURE 3G COMPUTED STATISTICS [MANUSCRIPT]:: POST-BAA REFORMS -- (REGIME 0: E > A)   ***

* [SEE ALSO, TABLE SI-5C: REGULAR BUDGET - REPORTED MODEL] CONDITIONAL MARGINAL EFFECT OF EBI UNDER POST-BAA REFORMS WHEN LN[AHT] = 0 == AHT = 1 YEAR OF EXPERIENCE  *
lincom [congbudchangereg2_0]execbudchangereg2 + [congbudchangereg2_0]ebcreg2baa 
*
*
* CONDITIONAL MARGINAL EFFECT OF EBI UNDER POST-BAA REFORMS WHEN LN[AHT] = 0.6931472 == AHT = 2 YEARS OF EXPERIENCE *
lincom [congbudchangereg2_0]execbudchangereg2 + [congbudchangereg2_0]ebcreg2baa + [congbudchangereg2_0]ebcreg2lnaht*0.6931472  /// 
+ [congbudchangereg2_0]ebcreg2baalnaht*0.6931472 
*
*
* CONDITIONAL MARGINAL EFFECT OF EBI UNDER POST-BAA REFORMS  WHEN LN[AHT] = 1.386294 == AHT = 4 YEARS OF EXPERIENCE *
lincom [congbudchangereg2_0]execbudchangereg2 + [congbudchangereg2_0]ebcreg2baa + [congbudchangereg2_0]ebcreg2lnaht*1.386294 ///
+[congbudchangereg2_0]ebcreg2baalnaht*1.386294  
*
*
* [SEE ALSO, TABLE SI-5C: REGULAR BUDGET - REPORTED MODEL] CONDITIONAL MARGINAL EFFECT OF EBI UNDER POST-BAA REFORMS WHEN LN[AHT] = 1.791759 == AHT = 6 YEARS OF EXPERIENCE *
lincom [congbudchangereg2_0]execbudchangereg2 + [congbudchangereg2_0]ebcreg2baa + [congbudchangereg2_0]ebcreg2lnaht*1.791759  ///
+ [congbudchangereg2_0]ebcreg2baalnaht*1.791759 
*
*
* CONDITIONAL MARGINAL EFFECT OF EBI UNDER POST-BAA REFORMS  WHEN LN[AHT] = 2.079442 == AHT = 8 YEARS OF EXPERIENCE *
lincom [congbudchangereg2_0]execbudchangereg2 + [congbudchangereg2_0]ebcreg2baa + [congbudchangereg2_0]ebcreg2lnaht*2.079442   ///
+ [congbudchangereg2_0]ebcreg2baalnaht*2.079442 
*
*
* CONDITIONAL MARGINAL EFFECT OF EBI UNDER POST-BAA REFORMS WHEN LN[AHT] = 2.302585  == AHT = 10 YEARS OF EXPERIENCE  *
lincom [congbudchangereg2_0]execbudchangereg2 + [congbudchangereg2_0]ebcreg2baa + [congbudchangereg2_0]ebcreg2lnaht*2.302585  ///
+ [congbudchangereg2_0]ebcreg2baalnaht*2.302585 
*
*
* [SEE ALSO, TABLE SI-5C: REGULAR BUDGET - REPORTED MODEL] CONDITIONAL MARGINAL EFFECT OF EBI UNDER POST-BAA REFORMS WHEN LN[AHT] = 2.484907  == AHT = 12 YEARS OF EXPERIENCE  *
lincom [congbudchangereg2_0]execbudchangereg2 + [congbudchangereg2_0]ebcreg2baa + [congbudchangereg2_0]ebcreg2lnaht*2.484907  ///
+ [congbudchangereg2_0]ebcreg2baalnaht*2.484907 
*
*
*
*
*

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*** TABLE 2 [MANUSCRIPT]: AUGMENTED AGENCY HEAD MODEL SPECIFICATION, II -- TOTAL DISCRETIONARY BUDGET [INCLUDES EXTRAMURAL FUNDS]: ENDOGENOUS REGIME SWITCHING REGRESSION MODELS /// ***                       ESTIMATED BY FIML [SELECTIVITY INSTRUMENT: AGENCY DESIGN (EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT / INDEPENDENT AGENCY BINARY DISTINCTION) ///
***                       *** LN [AGENCY HEAD TENURE [AHT]] -- FULL SAMPLE OF AHT OBSERVATIONS ***
***                       

movestay (congbudchangetot2 l1congbudchangetot2  execbudchangetot2 bureauofbudget ebctot2baa lnagencyheadtenure  /// 
baalnaht  ebctot2lnaht  ebctot2baalnaht  ///
lnagencyage unifiedpartygovt presadminyear) if agenid!=15, cluster(agenid) ///
select(regimetot = executiveagency) difficult
*
estat ic
*
*
*


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********** EVALUATING PROPOSITION 3 [WITHIN-REGIME MODEL RESTRICTION/COEFFICIENTS] **************************



*** TABLE SI-4B [TOTAL BUDGET: REPORTED MODEL] COMPUTED STATISTICS [SECTION 4. SUPPORTING INFORMATION DOCUMENT: TOTAL DISCRETIONARY BUDGET MODEL] WITHIN-REGIME MODEL RESTRICTION/COEFFICIENTS **

** BETA_13: REGIME 1: E <= A **
lincom [congbudchangetot2_1]ebctot2lnaht 
*
*
** BETA_23: REGIME 0: E > A **
lincom [congbudchangetot2_0]ebctot2lnaht 
*
*
**  BETA_14: REGIME 1: E <= A **
lincom  [congbudchangetot2_1]ebctot2baalnaht
*
*
** BETA_24: REGIME 0: E > A **
lincom  [congbudchangetot2_0]ebctot2baalnaht 
*
*
*
*
*
*
** FIGURE 3 COMPUTED STATISTICS [MANUSCRIPT: TOTAL DISCRETIONARY BUDGET MODEL] **


*** FIGURE 3B COMPUTED STATISTICS [MANUSCRIPT]: PRE-BAA REFORMS -- (REGIME 1: E <= A)   ***

* [SEE ALSO, TABLE SI-5C: TOTAL BUDGET - REPORTED MODEL] CONDITIONAL MARGINAL EFFECT OF EBI UNDER PRE-BAA REFORMS WHEN LN[AHT] = 0 == AHT = 1 YEAR OF EXPERIENCE  *
lincom [congbudchangetot2_1]execbudchangetot2
*
*
* CONDITIONAL MARGINAL EFFECT OF EBI UNDER PRE-BAA REFORMS WHEN LN[AHT] = 0.6931472 == AHT = 2 YEARS OF EXPERIENCE  *
lincom [congbudchangetot2_1]execbudchangetot2 + [congbudchangetot2_1]ebctot2lnaht*0.6931472
*
*
* CONDITIONAL MARGINAL EFFECT OF EBI UNDER PRE-BAA REFORMS WHEN LN[AHT] = 1.386294 == AHT = 4 YEARS OF EXPERIENCE  *
lincom [congbudchangetot2_1]execbudchangetot2 + [congbudchangetot2_1]ebctot2lnaht*1.386294
*
*
* [SEE ALSO, TABLE SI-5C: TOTAL BUDGET - REPORTED MODEL]  CONDITIONAL MARGINAL EFFECT OF EBI UNDER PRE-BAA REFORMS WHEN LN[AHT] = 1.791759  == AHT = 6 YEARS OF EXPERIENCE  *
lincom [congbudchangetot2_1]execbudchangetot2 + [congbudchangetot2_1]ebctot2lnaht*1.791759 
*
*
* CONDITIONAL MARGINAL EFFECT OF EBI UNDER PRE-BAA REFORMS WHEN LN[AHT] = 2.079442  == AHT = 8 YEARS OF EXPERIENCE  *
lincom [congbudchangetot2_1]execbudchangetot2 + [congbudchangetot2_1]ebctot2lnaht*2.079442 
*
*
* CONDITIONAL MARGINAL EFFECT OF EBI UNDER PRE-BAA REFORMS WHEN LN[AHT] = 2.302585  == AHT = 10 YEARS OF EXPERIENCE  *
lincom [congbudchangetot2_1]execbudchangetot2 + [congbudchangetot2_1]ebctot2lnaht*2.302585
*
*
* [SEE ALSO, TABLE SI-5C: TOTAL BUDGET - REPORTED MODEL]  CONDITIONAL MARGINAL EFFECT OF EBI UNDER PRE-BAA REFORMS WHEN LN[AHT] = 2.484907  == AHT = 12 YEARS OF EXPERIENCE  *
lincom [congbudchangetot2_1]execbudchangetot2 + [congbudchangetot2_1]ebctot2lnaht*2.484907




*** FIGURE 3F COMPUTED STATISTICS [MANUSCRIPT]: POST-BAA REFORMS -- (REGIME 1: E <= A)   ***

* [SEE ALSO, TABLE SI-5C: TOTAL BUDGET - REPORTED MODEL]  CONDITIONAL MARGINAL EFFECT OF EBI UNDER POST-BAA REFORMS WHEN LN[AHT] = 0 == AHT = 1 YEAR OF EXPERIENCE  *
lincom [congbudchangetot2_1]execbudchangetot2 + [congbudchangetot2_1]ebctot2baa 
*
*
* CONDITIONAL MARGINAL EFFECT OF EBI UNDER POST-BAA REFORMS WHEN LN[AHT] = 0.6931472 == AHT = 2 YEARS OF EXPERIENCE *
lincom [congbudchangetot2_1]execbudchangetot2 + [congbudchangetot2_1]ebctot2baa + [congbudchangetot2_1]ebctot2lnaht*0.6931472 + [congbudchangetot2_1]ebctot2baalnaht*0.6931472
*
*
* CONDITIONAL MARGINAL EFFECT OF EBI UNDER POST-BAA REFORMS  WHEN LN[AHT] = 1.386294 == AHT = 4 YEARS OF EXPERIENCE *
lincom [congbudchangetot2_1]execbudchangetot2 + [congbudchangetot2_1]ebctot2baa + [congbudchangetot2_1]ebctot2lnaht*1.386294 + [congbudchangetot2_1]ebctot2baalnaht*1.386294
*
*
* [SEE ALSO, TABLE SI-5C: TOTAL BUDGET - REPORTED MODEL]  CONDITIONAL MARGINAL EFFECT OF EBI UNDER POST-BAA REFORMS WHEN LN[AHT] = 1.791759 == AHT = 6 YEARS OF EXPERIENCE *
lincom [congbudchangetot2_1]execbudchangetot2 + [congbudchangetot2_1]ebctot2baa + [congbudchangetot2_1]ebctot2lnaht*1.791759 + [congbudchangetot2_1]ebctot2baalnaht*1.791759
*
*
* CONDITIONAL MARGINAL EFFECT OF EBI UNDER POST-BAA REFORMS  WHEN LN[AHT] = 2.079442 == AHT = 8 YEARS OF EXPERIENCE *
lincom [congbudchangetot2_1]execbudchangetot2 + [congbudchangetot2_1]ebctot2baa + [congbudchangetot2_1]ebctot2lnaht*2.079442 + [congbudchangetot2_1]ebctot2baalnaht*2.079442
*
*
* CONDITIONAL MARGINAL EFFECT OF EBI UNDER POST-BAA REFORMS WHEN LN[AHT] = 2.302585  == AHT = 10 YEARS OF EXPERIENCE  *
lincom [congbudchangetot2_1]execbudchangetot2 + [congbudchangetot2_1]ebctot2baa + [congbudchangetot2_1]ebctot2lnaht*2.302585 + [congbudchangetot2_1]ebctot2baalnaht*2.302585
*
*
* [SEE ALSO, TABLE SI-5C: TOTAL BUDGET - REPORTED MODEL]  CONDITIONAL MARGINAL EFFECT OF EBI UNDER POST-BAA REFORMS WHEN LN[AHT] = 2.484907  == AHT = 12 YEARS OF EXPERIENCE  *
lincom [congbudchangetot2_1]execbudchangetot2 + [congbudchangetot2_1]ebctot2baa + [congbudchangetot2_1]ebctot2lnaht*2.484907 + [congbudchangetot2_1]ebctot2baalnaht*2.484907

*
*
*
*
*
*

*** FIGURE 3D COMPUTED STATISTICS [MANUSCRIPT]: PRE-BAA REFORMS -- (REGIME 0: E > A)   ***

* [SEE ALSO, TABLE SI-5C: TOTAL BUDGET - REPORTED MODEL]  CONDITIONAL MARGINAL EFFECT OF EBI UNDER PRE-BAA REFORMS WHEN LN[AHT] = 0 == AHT = 1 YEAR OF EXPERIENCE  *
lincom [congbudchangetot2_0]execbudchangetot2
*
*
* CONDITIONAL MARGINAL EFFECT OF EBI UNDER PRE-BAA REFORMS WHEN LN[AHT] = 0.6931472 == AHT = 2 YEARS OF EXPERIENCE  *
lincom [congbudchangetot2_0]execbudchangetot2 + [congbudchangetot2_0]ebctot2lnaht*0.6931472  
*
*
* CONDITIONAL MARGINAL EFFECT OF EBI UNDER PRE-BAA REFORMS WHEN LN[AHT] = 1.386294 == AHT = 4 YEARS OF EXPERIENCE  *
lincom [congbudchangetot2_0]execbudchangetot2 + [congbudchangetot2_0]ebctot2lnaht*1.386294  
*
*
* [SEE ALSO, TABLE SI-5C: TOTAL BUDGET - REPORTED MODEL]  CONDITIONAL MARGINAL EFFECT OF EBI UNDER PRE-BAA REFORMS WHEN LN[AHT] = 1.791759  == AHT = 6 YEARS OF EXPERIENCE  *
lincom [congbudchangetot2_0]execbudchangetot2 + [congbudchangetot2_0]ebctot2lnaht*1.791759 
*
*
* CONDITIONAL MARGINAL EFFECT OF EBI UNDER PRE-BAA REFORMS WHEN LN[AHT] = 2.079442  == AHT = 8 YEARS OF EXPERIENCE  *
lincom [congbudchangetot2_0]execbudchangetot2 + [congbudchangetot2_0]ebctot2lnaht*2.079442 
*
*
* CONDITIONAL MARGINAL EFFECT OF EBI UNDER PRE-BAA REFORMS WHEN LN[AHT] = 2.302585  == AHT = 10 YEARS OF EXPERIENCE  *
lincom [congbudchangetot2_0]execbudchangetot2 + [congbudchangetot2_0]ebctot2lnaht*2.302585 
*
*
* [SEE ALSO, TABLE SI-5C: TOTAL BUDGET - REPORTED MODEL]  CONDITIONAL MARGINAL EFFECT OF EBI UNDER PRE-BAA REFORMS WHEN LN[AHT] = 2.484907  == AHT = 12 YEARS OF EXPERIENCE  *
lincom [congbudchangetot2_0]execbudchangetot2 + [congbudchangetot2_0]ebctot2lnaht*2.484907 

*
*
*
*
*

*** FIGURE 3H COMPUTED STATISTICS [MANUSCRIPT]: POST-BAA REFORMS -- (REGIME 0: E > A)   ***

* [SEE ALSO, TABLE SI-5C: TOTAL BUDGET - REPORTED MODEL]  CONDITIONAL MARGINAL EFFECT OF EBI UNDER POST-BAA REFORMS WHEN LN[AHT] = 0 == AHT = 1 YEAR OF EXPERIENCE  *
lincom [congbudchangetot2_0]execbudchangetot2 + [congbudchangetot2_0]ebctot2baa 
*
*
* CONDITIONAL MARGINAL EFFECT OF EBI UNDER POST-BAA REFORMS WHEN LN[AHT] = 0.6931472 == AHT = 2 YEARS OF EXPERIENCE *
lincom [congbudchangetot2_0]execbudchangetot2 + [congbudchangetot2_0]ebctot2baa + [congbudchangetot2_0]ebctot2lnaht*0.6931472  /// 
+ [congbudchangetot2_0]ebctot2baalnaht*0.6931472
*
*
* CONDITIONAL MARGINAL EFFECT OF EBI UNDER POST-BAA REFORMS  WHEN LN[AHT] = 1.386294 == AHT = 4 YEARS OF EXPERIENCE *
lincom [congbudchangetot2_0]execbudchangetot2 + [congbudchangetot2_0]ebctot2baa + [congbudchangetot2_0]ebctot2lnaht*1.386294  ///
+[congbudchangetot2_0]ebctot2baalnaht*1.386294 
*
*
* [SEE ALSO, TABLE SI-5C: TOTAL BUDGET - REPORTED MODEL]  CONDITIONAL MARGINAL EFFECT OF EBI UNDER POST-BAA REFORMS WHEN LN[AHT] = 1.791759 == AHT = 6 YEARS OF EXPERIENCE *
lincom [congbudchangetot2_0]execbudchangetot2 + [congbudchangetot2_0]ebctot2baa + [congbudchangetot2_0]ebctot2lnaht*1.791759  ///
+ [congbudchangetot2_0]ebctot2baalnaht*1.791759 
*
*
* CONDITIONAL MARGINAL EFFECT OF EBI UNDER POST-BAA REFORMS  WHEN LN[AHT] = 2.079442 == AHT = 8 YEARS OF EXPERIENCE *
lincom [congbudchangetot2_0]execbudchangetot2 + [congbudchangetot2_0]ebctot2baa + [congbudchangetot2_0]ebctot2lnaht*2.079442  ///
+ [congbudchangetot2_0]ebctot2baalnaht*2.079442 
*
*
* CONDITIONAL MARGINAL EFFECT OF EBI UNDER POST-BAA REFORMS WHEN LN[AHT] = 2.302585  == AHT = 10 YEARS OF EXPERIENCE  *
lincom [congbudchangetot2_0]execbudchangetot2 + [congbudchangetot2_0]ebctot2baa + [congbudchangetot2_0]ebctot2lnaht*2.302585 ///
+ [congbudchangetot2_0]ebctot2baalnaht*2.302585
*
*
* [SEE ALSO, TABLE SI-5C: TOTAL BUDGET - REPORTED MODEL]  CONDITIONAL MARGINAL EFFECT OF EBI UNDER POST-BAA REFORMS WHEN LN[AHT] = 2.484907  == AHT = 12 YEARS OF EXPERIENCE  *
lincom [congbudchangetot2_0]execbudchangetot2 + [congbudchangetot2_0]ebctot2baa + [congbudchangetot2_0]ebctot2lnaht*2.484907  ///
+ [congbudchangetot2_0]ebctot2baalnaht*2.484907 









 * SAVE "EXECUTIVE BUDGETARY INFLUENCE" DATABASE AFTER ANALYSES OF REPORTED MODELS *
 
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